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COMMENT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, BY KEITH MASKUS
Robert E. Evenson*
It is clear that over the past century every developed market
economy in the world has built functioning intellectual property rights
systems (IPRS). It is also the case that every developed market economy in
recent decades has implemented either legal or administrative changes (and
in most cases both) that constitute strengthened IPRS. All developed
market economies are also on record as supporting stronger international
IPR regimes, as reflected in the TRIPS provisions of the WTO agreement.
Against this background, it is somewhat puzzling that developing
countries express political resistance and often hostility to strengthened
IPRS. Many developing countries are reluctant to strengthen IPRS even
while recognizing that property rights in land and structures are essential to
efficient market production. Except for IPRS, developing countries
generally see the legal institutions that characterize developed market
economies (e.g., contract law, labor law, bankruptcy law) as essential to
growth and efficiency.
In Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development,1 Keith
Maskus discusses the effects of IPRS on growth, noting that both positive
and negative effects may be realized.2 His paper is in the tradition of
economic analyses of IPRS, beginning with the review of the U.S. Patent
System by Machlup. There is a curious disjuncture between the analyses of
IPRS by economists who generally do not offer strong endorsements of
strengthened IPRS and the obvious fact that strengthened IPRS have broad
political support in developed countries.
Maskus offers a useful taxonomy of IPRS and reviews studies of
determinants of IPRS in different countries.3  His review confirms the
observation that developing countries are diverse in their IPRS and in
innovative activity. The least developed countries do virtually nothing in
domestic innovation and generally do not have functioning IPRS. As
countries mature they begin to invest in public sector agricultural research,
but since most plant and animal invention has not been given IPR
protection until recently, these countries do not use IPRS to provide
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incentives for innovative activity. These developing countries do recognize
that foreign direct investment can be a conduit for technology acquisition,
but IPRS are typically not seen as essential to contracts between foreign
firms and domestic firms and governments.
It is in the advanced developing countries that we see strong IPRS
emerge. These economies are forming domestic research and development
(R&D) capabilities in industrial sectors as well as stronger public sector
agricultural research systems. These R&D capabilities are chiefly of the
adaptive innovation type, but they also endow many entrepreneurs in
developing countries with imitation or copying skills. Thus, these countries
are capable of IPR "piracy" and are often accused of such. Until the
"Section 301" actions by the United States and the subsequent TRIPS
negotiation, this piracy typically went unpunished. The incentives for
piracy by developing countries are evident from international patent data
that show that very few developing countries' inventions are patented
abroad. That is, given the adaptive nature of these inventions, they have
small markets upstream in developed countries and missing markets
downstream in less developed countries. With few seller interests to
protect, developing countries focus almost exclusively on buyer/imitator
interests.
This "buyer" emphasis on IPRS has probably impeded the
willingness of developing countries to design IPRS that are better suited to
their domestic interests. IPRS should, if properly designed, enable
economies to tap the innovative capabilities of a broad range of
entrepreneurs. A fixity on the role of IPRS vis-A-vis foreign suppliers does
not lead to ideal IPRS. Maskus devotes a section of his paper to benefiting
from IPRS and addresses some of the ways in which developing countries
can pursue modifications in IPRS and complementary investments to better
achieve IPR objectives.4
However, the major effect of recent developments, notably the
TRIPS agreement and other provisions of the WTO agreement, is the
implied use of a strong "piracy penalty." Maskus refers to the studies of the
late Edwin Mansfield on the effect of IPRS on the willingness of
international firms to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) in
developing countries and to expose their latest technological developments
in their markets. 5  These studies indicate that the piracy penalty is
significant. It also appears to be the case that the technology conduit
dimensions of FDI are recognized as becoming increasingly important.
Developing countries are thus confronted with what is apparently a
significant piracy penalty at the same time that the FDI technology conduit
role is becoming more important. They are also confronted with the need to
implement TRIPS provisions under the WTO agreements. These
4 See id. at 495.
5 See id. at 484.
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developments, along with the likelihood that there are unexploited benefits
from domestic design opportunities for IPRS, would appear to call for a
major change in developing countries' IPRS policy. This would mean a
shift from grudging resistance toward internationally designed IPRS to a
policy of aggressive implementation of domestically designed IPRS
(subject to accepted international rules). It would be a shift from "fear of
exploitation by foreigners" to a policy of "exploiting foreigners." This
change has occurred in a few developing (or former developing) countries,
notably South Korea; however, most developing countries have not yet
made the change.
Maskus' review of the evidence generally supports the policy shift,
but he does not quite endorse it. It is relevant to note that the experience of
recent decades does not include the piracy penalty period. Thus, empirical
relationships between total factor productivity (TFP) and R&D, or IPRS
and R&D may well have changed recently. The review, however, is
illuminating in that it shows that IPR effects on growth rates are not
independent of other policies, notably international trade policy.
Maskus' report results from a "general equilibrium trade mode"
6
that is of interest and certainly suggests a direction for further research. He
does not discuss the recent spate of endogenous growth models in the
context of IPRS, although presumably the general equilibrium model is
influenced by these models. This is probably because these models offer
little insight into the mechanics of technology spillover or the role of IPRS
in these mechanics. Some models presume that technology applied in one
economic setting and found to be valuable (i.e. cost minimizing) is equally
valuable in another setting ("anyone can read a blueprint"). Studies of
agricultural technology clearly show that climate and soil differences
between economic settings will impede the spillover of technology and that
biological technology has to be separately "tailored" to different settings to
be of value. Much of the industrial technology is similarly impeded
because it is linked to biological technology (agricultural machinery) or
interacts with economic or institutional factors.
The inherent degree of technology specificity between economic
settings or locations has implications for the economic effects of IPRS.
Ironically, it is in the agricultural invention fields that resistance to IPRS is
the strongest (e.g., India). This is so even though very few of these
inventions have value in another country. By contrast, a particular
industrial chemical may have value in most economies.
The literature on "returns to R&D," both private and social (based
on externalities), is primarily based on studies in developed countries.
Recent studies of R&D "spillovers" reinforce the implication that social
returns exceed private returns because of externalities in the form of
spillovers. It appears that private returns to R&D have a higher variance,
6 Id. at 482.
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but are of the same magnitude as private returns to investment in plant and
equipment. Social returns appear to be much higher.
While few studies of returns to R&D in developing countries have
been made, there appears to be good reason to expect an even larger
divergence between social and private returns in developing countries,
because of international spillovers. Studies of R&D conducted in public
sector agricultural experiment statistics measure high social rates of return
and attribute much of this return to spill-in facilitation.
Policymakers in developing countries are being pressured both
domestically and internationally to build stronger IPRS. By no means have
they completed their response to the pressures built up in recent years.
Economists have traditionally been divided on the economic consequences
of IPRS, even though developed countries' governments and courts have
decidedly favored strong IPRS. Maskus' paper evaluates many economic
arguments and reviews complex empirical evidence. It supports a policy
direction toward developing stronger and more domestically focused IPRS.
Policymakers will find it well worth reading.
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